# zsmtp An SMTP client and server library for Zig (RFC 5321). Both the client and the server run over plain `std.Io.Reader`/`std.Io.Writer` pairs, so they are transport-agnostic: wrap a TCP stream for real use, or fixed in-memory buffers in tests. Requires Zig 0.16. ## Client ```zig const zsmtp = @import("zsmtp"); var reply_buf: [1024]u8 = undefined; var client: zsmtp.Client = .init(&stream_reader.interface, &stream_writer.interface, &reply_buf); _ = try client.greet(); // read the 220 greeting _ = try client.hello("my-host.example.com"); // EHLO (HELO fallback), returns extensions try client.sendMail("me@example.com", &.{"you@example.net"}, message); try client.quit(); ``` Line endings in the message are normalized to CRLF and leading dots are stuffed automatically. On `error.UnexpectedReply`, `client.last_reply` holds the server's actual code and text. `mailFrom`/`rcptTo`/`sendMessage` are also available individually. Message bodies can also be streamed instead of passed as a slice — from any reader via `sendMessageReader(&reader)`, or push-style via `data()`, which returns a writer that dot-stuffs and normalizes line endings as content flows through it: ```zig var data_writer = try client.data(); try data_writer.interface.print("Subject: report {d}\r\n\r\n", .{id}); // ... stream as much as needed ... try data_writer.end(); // terminates the message, reads the verdict ``` When the server advertises CHUNKING (`extensions.chunking`), `bdat` and `sendMessageChunked` transmit the message with length-framed BDAT chunks instead of DATA — verbatim, with no dot-stuffing, so content must already use CRLF line endings. ### Authentication `hello` reports the server's advertised mechanisms in `extensions.auth`; `authenticate` picks the best one (PLAIN, then LOGIN, then CRAM-MD5), or use `authPlain`/`authLogin`/`authCramMd5` directly. PLAIN and LOGIN send credentials unprotected, so use TLS on real networks. A 535 rejection surfaces as `error.AuthenticationFailed` with the reply in `last_reply`. ```zig const extensions = try client.hello("my-host.example.com"); try client.authenticate(extensions, "user", "password"); ``` ### TLS `zsmtp.Tls` wraps [ianic/tls.zig](https://github.com/ianic/tls.zig) and verifies against the system trust store by default (a caller-managed CA bundle and an insecure mode are also available). The stream reader/writer handed to it need buffers of at least `zsmtp.Tls.min_buffer_len` bytes, and `init` must run at the value's final address (the connection holds interior pointers). The standard library's TLS client is deliberately not used: it requires the optional TLS 1.3 middlebox-compatibility ChangeCipherSpec record, which servers like Exim disable. Implicit TLS (port 465) — handshake first, then speak SMTP: ```zig var tls: zsmtp.Tls = undefined; try tls.init(gpa, io, &stream_reader.interface, &stream_writer.interface, .{ .host = "smtp.example.com", }); defer tls.deinit(gpa); var client: zsmtp.Client = .init(tls.reader(), tls.writer(), &reply_buf); // ... greet, hello, sendMail ... try client.quit(); try tls.end(); // close_notify, before closing the socket ``` STARTTLS (port 587) — upgrade mid-session, then EHLO again: ```zig _ = try client.greet(); _ = try client.hello("my-host.example.com"); // check .starttls in the result try client.starttls(); var tls: zsmtp.Tls = undefined; try tls.init(gpa, io, &stream_reader.interface, &stream_writer.interface, .{ .host = "smtp.example.com", }); client.setTransport(tls.reader(), tls.writer()); _ = try client.hello("my-host.example.com"); // server state was reset ``` ## Server ```zig var session: zsmtp.Server = .init(&stream_reader.interface, &stream_writer.interface, .{ .context = &my_state, .vtable = &.{ .authenticate = onAuth, // optional; enables AUTH PLAIN and LOGIN .rcptTo = onRcptTo, // optional; accept/reject each recipient .message = onMessage, // required; receives envelope + message data }, }, .{ .hostname = "mx.example.com" }); try session.run(gpa); ``` With an `authenticate` callback the session advertises and accepts AUTH PLAIN and AUTH LOGIN (RFC 4954); setting `Options.require_auth` rejects MAIL with 530 until the client has authenticated. Instead of `message` (which collects the whole body in memory, bounded by `max_message_size`), a handler can set `messageReader` to stream it: the callback receives an `Io.Reader` yielding the unstuffed message content, and anything left unread is drained by the session. `run` serves one connection until QUIT or disconnect, enforcing command sequencing, recipient and message-size limits, and un-stuffing message data. Messages may also arrive via BDAT chunks (CHUNKING is advertised); both the collecting and streaming handler paths receive the reassembled content. MAIL parameters are validated: `SIZE=` (RFC 1870) is rejected early with 552 when it exceeds `max_message_size`, `BODY=7BIT`/`BODY=8BITMIME` (RFC 6152) are accepted, and unrecognized parameters get 555; the declared size and body type reach the handler via `Envelope`. Listening, accepting, and concurrency are up to the caller. To advertise and accept STARTTLS (TLS 1.3, via [ianic/tls.zig](https://github.com/ianic/tls.zig)), pass a certificate key pair; the stream buffers must then be at least `zsmtp.tls.input_buffer_len` / `zsmtp.tls.output_buffer_len` bytes, since the handshake runs over them: ```zig var auth: zsmtp.tls.config.CertKeyPair = try .fromFilePath(gpa, io, .cwd(), "cert.pem", "key.pem"); defer auth.deinit(gpa); var session: zsmtp.Server = .init(&stream_reader.interface, &stream_writer.interface, handler, .{ .hostname = "mx.example.com", .tls = .{ .io = io, .auth = &auth }, }); try session.run(gpa); ``` On STARTTLS the session answers 220, performs the server handshake, swaps its transport to the encrypted connection, and resets state per RFC 3207 (the client must EHLO again). With `.mode = .implicit` the handshake instead runs before the greeting (SMTPS, port 465 style): ```zig var session: zsmtp.Server = .init(&stream_reader.interface, &stream_writer.interface, handler, .{ .hostname = "mx.example.com", .tls = .{ .io = io, .auth = &auth, .mode = .implicit }, }); ``` ## Demo CLI ```sh zig build # Debug server that prints received messages to stdout # (with a cert/key pair it advertises and accepts STARTTLS): ./zig-out/bin/zsmtp serve 2525 ./zig-out/bin/zsmtp serve --tls-cert cert.pem --tls-key key.pem 2525 ./zig-out/bin/zsmtp serve --tls-cert cert.pem --tls-key key.pem --implicit-tls 2465 # Send a message read from stdin: printf 'Subject: hi\r\n\r\nhello\r\n' | \ ./zig-out/bin/zsmtp send 127.0.0.1 2525 me@example.com you@example.net # Same, over implicit TLS or STARTTLS (--insecure skips cert verification): zsmtp send --tls smtp.example.com 465 me@example.com you@example.net zsmtp send --starttls smtp.example.com 587 me@example.com you@example.net ``` ## Status TLS is supported on both sides via [ianic/tls.zig](https://github.com/ianic/tls.zig): the client does implicit TLS and STARTTLS via `zsmtp.Tls`, and the server accepts both STARTTLS and implicit TLS (TLS 1.3 only). AUTH covers PLAIN, LOGIN, and CRAM-MD5 on the client and PLAIN and LOGIN on the server. Message bodies can be streamed on both sides, and the server validates MAIL parameters (SIZE=, BODY=). ## Standards - [RFC 5321](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5321) — Simple Mail Transfer Protocol: the command/reply protocol, multiline replies, dot-stuffing, reply classes, and ESMTP parameter syntax (client and server). - [RFC 1870](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1870) — SIZE: advertised and enforced by the server (oversize declarations are rejected with 552 before DATA); parsed from EHLO by the client. - [RFC 6152](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6152) — 8BITMIME: advertised by the server and `BODY=` validated; parsed by the client. - [RFC 3030](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3030) — CHUNKING (BDAT): client and server, with length-based framing and no dot-stuffing; the companion BINARYMIME extension is not implemented (`BODY=BINARYMIME` is rejected). - [RFC 2920](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2920) — PIPELINING: advertised by the server, whose strictly sequential command loop handles pipelined clients naturally; parsed by the client. - [RFC 3207](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3207) — STARTTLS: client and server, including the mandatory post-handshake state reset. - [RFC 8314](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8314) — implicit TLS (SMTPS): client (`Tls` before any SMTP traffic) and server (`.mode = .implicit`). - [RFC 4954](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4954) — AUTH: client and server, including initial responses and `*` cancellation. - [RFC 4616](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4616) — the PLAIN SASL mechanism (client and server). - [RFC 2195](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2195) — CRAM-MD5 (client only; the server would need plaintext-equivalent credentials). - [draft-murchison-sasl-login](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-murchison-sasl-login-00) — the de-facto AUTH LOGIN mechanism (client and server). - [RFC 3463](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3463) / [RFC 2034](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2034) — enhanced status codes: carried in every server reply and advertised via ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES; detected by the client. - [RFC 6531](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6531) — SMTPUTF8: client (`mailFromUtf8`) and server (advertised; non-ASCII addresses require the parameter and must be valid UTF-8, rejected with 553 5.6.7 per [RFC 6533](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6533) otherwise; the flag reaches handlers via `Envelope.smtputf8`). TLS itself (TLS 1.3, [RFC 8446](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446)) is provided by [ianic/tls.zig](https://github.com/ianic/tls.zig). ## Tests ```sh zig build test zig build test --fuzz # run the fuzz tests under the fuzzer (endless) ``` The fuzz tests cover parser crash-safety (`Command.parse`, `Reply.read`), whole-session robustness against arbitrary bytes on both the client and server side, and two differential properties: the streaming `DataWriter` must produce byte-identical output to the slice-based `writeStuffed` under fuzzer-chosen chunk boundaries, and the collecting and streaming server DATA paths must yield identical message content. ### Protocol torture testing with exim's test client Exim's scriptable SMTP test client (`test/src/client.c` in the exim source) sends raw protocol lines and asserts reply prefixes. The exim source is declared as a *lazy* Zig dependency, fetched only on demand: ```sh zig build -Dexim-client # fetches exim, installs zig-out/bin/exim-client ./zig-out/bin/zsmtp serve 2525 & ./zig-out/bin/exim-client 127.0.0.1 2525 < test/protocol-torture.script ``` `test/protocol-torture.script` is a 28-reply dialogue distilled from exim's own test suite (syntax errors, sequencing violations, parameter validation, dot-stuffing); the same dialogue is asserted byte-for-byte as a unit test in `Server.zig`. The library is MIT-licensed; the small amount of test-only material adapted from exim's test suite (the torture script and the gauntlet unit test's dialogue) is GPL-2.0-or-later, marked with SPDX snippet tags and REUSE.toml annotations. Note: Zig 0.16.0's fuzz *driver* is broken out of the box (its bundled test runner fails to compile in fuzz mode, and the coverage server panics on a test binary with no fuzz tests); both are fixed on Zig master. Until then, fuzzing needs a patched copy of the standard library via `zig build --zig-lib-dir test --fuzz`. The fuzz tests themselves also run once per invocation as part of the normal `zig build test` suite. Interoperability against third-party implementations is covered by a NixOS VM test (`nix/interop-test.nix`): the zsmtp client delivers mail to Postfix and Exim over plaintext, STARTTLS, and implicit TLS against each, and swaks delivers to the zsmtp server over plaintext and STARTTLS. ```sh nix build .#zsmtp # build the package nix build .#checks.x86_64-linux.interop # run the VM interop test ```